Розділ «SYNOPSIS OF THE BOOK: THE UKRAINIAN DIVISION "GALICIA" THE HISTORY OF ITS FORMATION AND MILITARY OPERATIONS»

In his concluding observations, the author summarizes the mistakes made by the German authorities in organization, training and committing the Division to combat. He brings out these points:

In accordance with the initial plans,, the Ukrainian Division should have been a foreign military unit, and not a German unit composed of Ukrainians. An utterly senseless policy regarding command posts in the Division had adverse effects on the Ukrainians for the whole period. The Ukrainian officers of the Division should have been appointed to the command posts and given a greater responsibility in tactical planning;

at least they should have been given an opportunity to receive staff training. It must be marginally noted that the Ukrainian officer and non-commissioned officer cadres fulfilled their assigned tasks and duties well.

The ordering of the Division in the front lines was a mistake; more heed should have been paid to the reports of the Staff of the Division about its specific characteristics and the unique traits, of character of the Ukrainian soldier. Despite this, the Division was thrown without adequate training and battle experience into a main enemy thrust where even battle-tried veteran German divisions succumbed. The High Command of Infantry and the Army Group "Northern Ukraine" ignored great political significance of the Division. The developments at the front in the sector east of Lviv could have been foreseen. The order to send the Division into battle resulted from a typically German way of thinking without taking into account its peculiarity. The sending of the Ukrainians to the most dangerous point at the front without providing them with experience in modern warfare, was doomed from the outset to failure.

This important military unit also lacked of good commander who should have been a talented and politically oriented soldier. Instead, it had the self-seeking, unpleasant and bureaucratic General Freitag.

Permission to use Ukrainian emblems, the Ukrainian anthem, and an oath of loyalty to Ukraine came too late. The creation of the Ukrainian National Committee and the Ukrainian National Army headed by General Pavlo Shandruk came even later, only two months before the end of the war.